CIVICUS speaks with Rasmus Alenius Boserup, executive director of EuroMed Rights, about the recent deal signed between the European Union (EU) and Egypt and its implications for the rights of migrants and refugees.
EuroMed Rights is a civil society platform that promotes cooperation and dialogue among countries in the Mediterranean region. It was established in 1997 in response to the 1995 Barcelona Declaration – an agreement between the EU and 12 southern Mediterranean countries – and currently includes 68 human rights groups in 30 countries. It works to advance human rights and democratic reforms and fosters civil society partnerships to improve its members’ capacity for achieving these objectives.
What’s the recent EU-Egypt deal about, and why it is concerning?
On 17 March 2024, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen travelled to Cairo, Egypt, alongside leaders of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Greece and Italy to announce a new ‘Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership’ (SCP) with Egypt. This agreement is similar to other deals reached by the Commission with other Mediterranean countries, such as its 2016 agreement with Turkey and the 2023 memorandum of understanding with Tunisia.
It involves a substantial amount of money: €7.4 billion (approx. US$7.9 billion) in loans and grants will be provided to Egypt between 2024 and 2027, with the declared purpose of strengthening stability, prosperity and environmental sustainability in the region.
The SCP represents a clear enhancement of EU-Egypt relations. It encompasses several areas, including political relations, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, macroeconomic stability, sustainable investment and trade, energy, water, food security, climate change, migration, security and human capital development. However, it comes in a context of no improvement in Egypt’s human rights situation. Civic space continues to be heavily restricted and activists, journalists and anyone expressing dissent is oppressed by the regime. Arbitrary arrests and mistreatment in detention are common practices. The country’s leadership is authoritarian and unaccountable.
Most of the SCP is structured as ‘macro-financial assistance’: €5 billion (approx. US$5.3 billion) of funding will take the form of concessional loans. European macro-financial assistance, however, must be contingent on criteria such as effective adherence to democratic principles and practices, including a multi-party system and the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. These criteria have clearly been overlooked in the Commission’s proposals to the Council and the European Parliament – otherwise, Egypt shouldn’t be receiving this assistance.
Over the years, reports of human rights abuses in Egypt have resulted in European Parliament resolutions and condemnations. Numerous meetings between Egyptian civil society and European stakeholders have highlighted Egypt’s deteriorating human rights situation and warned against the Egyptian government’s cosmetic policies.
Egypt has recently adopted a national human rights strategy, lifted the state of emergency, relaunched its Pardon Committee and initiated a National Dialogue. But all this has been a public relations exercise aimed at whitewashing the authoritarian regime’s international image. The December 2023 presidential election and the campaign that preceded it made abundantly clear that there were no effective democratic mechanisms in place. Nevertheless, the Commission used those facade policies to justify Egypt’s eligibility for macro-financial assistance.
In this bleak scenario, the commitments to human rights and the rule of law included in the SCP are vague and risk perpetuating rather than resolving the human rights crisis by legitimising Egyptian president Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s repression. Instead of acting in a manner guided by the principles of the rule of law, democracy and human rights, the EU is leaning towards supporting and financing authoritarian regimes under the guise of security.
What are the SCP’s implications for migration?
The SCP follows the same approach to outsourcing border management to non-member countries that the EU and its member states have taken for years: first with Turkey, then with Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, and now with Egypt.
Externalisation agreements make migratory routes more dangerous and deadly. We’ve seen it before: the Central Mediterranean route – the stretch of sea between Libya, Tunisia and Italy – is one of the world’s deadliest migration routes. Last year we saw one of the most lethal shipwrecks near the shores of Pylos, Greece, where at least 600 people – mainly from Egypt, Pakistan and Syria – lost their lives.
In Egypt, migrants and refugees face numerous human rights violations. The government doesn’t grant residency permits or recognise identity documents issued by the UN Refugee Agency. Egyptian security forces carry out arbitrary and systematic raids against migrants, often based on racial profiling. In border areas and within the country, thousands are arrested and detained in various facilities, from prisons to police stations, in inhumane conditions. After being detained, many are forcibly deported in breach of the international principle of non-refoulement, which forbids a country that receives asylum seekers returning them to a country where they would be in probable danger.
Given the humanitarian crises unfolding in Egypt’s neighbourhood, particularly in Gaza and Sudan, this deal puts pressure on Egypt to boost its border control capacity at its borders with Sudan and Libya, as many Egyptians cross through Libya to take to the sea from its eastern coast. We fear this will lead to even more abuses and violations against migrants and refugees in Egypt.
What was civil society’s position during SCP negotiations?
In the weeks leading up to the announcement of the deal, we took part in discussions with policymakers at various levels. We advocated for the deal to include clear human rights benchmarks and prioritise accountability. We emphasised the need to avoid legitimising Sisi’s authoritarian rule, which has resulted in a steady decline in Egypt’s human rights situation since 2014. We also highlighted the connection between human rights and the socioeconomic crisis, pointing out that the deterioration of the rule of law has discouraged investment in Egypt and worsened the economic situation.
We passed on demands from local civil society organisations (CSOs), including ending harassment of human rights defenders, releasing political detainees and lifting media censorship. These should be essential conditions for any progress in relations with Egypt. We want our Egyptian colleagues in exile to be able to return to their country without fear of arrest or travel restrictions.
On migration, the EU’s focus on border management is misguided and short-sighted. Instead of prioritising border management, the EU should urge the Egyptian government to establish protection mechanisms for refugees. It must also avoid legitimising authoritarianism.
What should the EU do to ensure human rights are respected in the deal’s implementation?
The EU appears eager to act quickly. Egypt has recently received pledges amounting to US$50 billion from the United Arab Emirates, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, enabling authorities to borrow on financial markets again and avoiding an immediate risk of debt default. Despite this, the European Commission pushed for the approval of an initial instalment of €1 billion (approx. US$1.07 billion) for macro-financial assistance through an urgent procedure, bypassing European Parliament scrutiny.
The Council has already approved this first instalment, with the remainder expected to follow in three instalments before 2027. The Council has again stated that respect for effective democratic mechanisms, human rights and the rule of law is a precondition of granting the assistance. This is somewhat positive, but the wording is vague, creating uncertainty about how such conditionality will be enforced.
It is crucial that, when negotiating the details, the Commission implements credible mechanisms to assess whether tangible steps are being taken in the areas of democratisation and human rights. Each instalment must be contingent on measurable and timebound benchmarks, with the priority being the expansion of civic space beyond the cosmetic measures seen in recent years.
How is civil society in the Euro-Mediterranean region working to defend migrants’ rights?
Civil society calls for the opening of new and expanding existing legal pathways for migration, such as resettlement, family reunification, humanitarian corridors and wider access to visas. This is key to counter the trends we have monitored, condemned and worked to stop for years: deaths along migratory routes, border violence and systemic violations of the human rights of migrants and refugees.
Another crucial issue highlighted by civil society is that migration management agreements often involve financial support, equipment and training of security forces in authoritarian regimes. This ultimately strengthens non-democratic states people are trying to escape from.
In relation to the deal with Egypt, a primary civil society demand is to shift focus away from border management and towards establishing protection mechanisms for refugees and expanding access to legal pathways for safe migration.
What international support does civil society need to continue this work?
There is a growing sense of isolation and hopelessness among civil society organisations (CSOs) across the Mediterranean. International mechanisms have proved inadequate in addressing the challenges we face, and the progressive erosion of human rights and civic freedoms in many Mediterranean countries has led to a strong sense of abandonment.
Some EU member states are cutting funding to civil society in the region. Germany, for instance, has decided to withdraw funding from some CSOs for criticising Israel and advocating for boycott, sanctions and divestment policies towards it. This jeopardises their ability to do essential work and undermines the values European states claim to uphold.
The EU has lost much of its credibility as a value-driven global player and ally to civil society. By prioritising a security-first approach and reaching compromises with authoritarian rulers to reinforce its borders, it has disappointed the hopes of activists, human rights defenders and journalists who pay a high price to keep civic space open.
International support should begin with a shift in mindset and a recentring of human rights and democratic values. International human rights organisations, diaspora voices and media have a crucial role in building alliances and amplifying messages to alleviate local civil society’s sense of isolation and ensure voices from the ground reach policymakers.
Get in touch with EuroMed Rights through its website and follow @EuroMedRights and @rasbos on Twitter.