S Rajaratnam Lecture 2025 by Prime Minister and Minister for Finance Lawrence Wong: "A Safe Harbour in a Turbulent World"

My Cabinet Colleagues

 

Excellencies and

 

Distinguished guests

 

Ladies and Gentlemen

 

1.                This year marks Singapore’s 60^th year of independence. 

 

2.                Back in 1965, few believed that we would make it. 

 

a.    We were a small city-state with no natural resources, no hinterland, no means of defence.  

 

b.   The odds were stacked against us. 

 

c.    But step by step, we defied expectations. We overcame challenges, and built the Singapore today as a vibrant, modern and globally respected nation. 

 

3.                So this SG60 year  really a time for reflection – to look back on how far we have come, and importantly to look ahead and chart the   way forward in a rapidly changing world. 

 

4.                To understand our journey, we must first understand the global environment in which our nation was forged.  

 

5.                Singapore’s success did not happen in a vacuum.  For much of the past 60 years, we thrived in a post-World War II rules-based international order – one that was shaped and underwritten by American leadership. 

 

6.                After the Second World War, the US took an extraordinary approach for a victorious power. 

 

a.    It supported decolonisation – paving the way for the independence of many nations in Africa and Asia.

 

b.   It helped to rebuild the economies of its defeated enemies, Germany and Japan, and it launched the Marshall Plan to help Western Europe get back on its feet.

 

c.    It established global institutions like the United Nations, the IMF, and the World Bank and GATT and later on the WTO.  It championed free trade and open markets.

 

d.   All this promoted an international system of rules and norms that enabled global cooperation. It created space for smaller nations like Singapore to participate meaningfully in world affairs and to benefit from global trade and development. 

 

7.                America pursued these efforts out of its own enlightened self-interest.  Because having been dragged into two World Wars, it was determined to prevent another global conflict. And it believed that by applying its power to uphold such a global order, it could foster peace and prosperity – not just for the world, but also for itself. 

 

8.                During the Cold War, the US took decisive steps to stem the tide of communism. Its intervention in Vietnam gave Southeast Asia – and Singapore – the time and space we needed to develop and grow.

 

9.                The Vietnam War remains controversial, and so what we say about it may not be universally accepted, even in America itself. But Singapore is profoundly grateful for the tremendous sacrifices the US made intervening in Indo-china at that time.

 

10.            Then when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the US stood alone as the sole superpower. Its leadership and security umbrella maintained peace and stability in Asia, and created an environment in which countries like Singapore could flourish and thrive.

 

11.            Of course, things were not perfect. From time to time, America was criticised for double standards and inconsistency. But by and large, it remained a force for stability and a force for good.

 

12.            It is in this international context that Singapore took flight. 

 

a.    Back  in 1972, Mr Rajaratnam envisioned Singapore as a global city – one that would “draw sustenance not only from the region, but also from the international economic system”. 

 

b.   This vision flourished because of the global environment of cooperation, rules and stability, and because Singapore chose to plug into this global system.

 

Shifting Attitudes and Abilities

 

13.            Today, very unfortunately, this international order is fraying. The conditions that sustained it no longer hold. 

 

14.            Within  America, support for global engagement has declined.  

 

a.    Many Americans feel left behind by globalisation – their communities have suffered job losses, stagnant wages and social dislocation.

 

b.   There is a growing sense that other countries are benefiting disproportionately from America’s security umbrella and access to its markets, while contributing little in return. 

 

c.    The long and costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 have deepened public weariness towards foreign entanglements. 

 

d.   And the shocks from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Covid pandemic have caused further disruptions and dislocations. 

 

15.              So there is now a strong and growing impulse within the US to turn inward – to focus on its own domestic priorities, and to scale back costly overseas commitments. 

 

16.            This shift is evident under the current US administration. The US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has highlighted that the unique role of the US was an “anomaly” and “a product of the end of the Cold War”. But this sentiment is not limited to one party alone.  It reflects deeper, structural changes in the American society – that the US can no longer afford to lead the world in resolving every problem, and it now needs to cut back on what it does abroad.  So this may not just be a temporary change in policy. This could reflect the new normal in the US for some time to come.

 

17.            At the same time, China has emerged as a near peer competitor of the US. 

 

a.    China has benefited immensely from the US-led order. 

 

b.   And today, a new generation of Chinese, raised in an era of rapid growth and national rejuvenation, believe that “the East is rising, and the West is declining”. 

 

c.    They are also more assertive – determined to correct the perceived humiliations of the past, and to secure what they see as China’s rightful place in the world.

 

18.            America and China are now locked in a fierce contest for global supremacy. Neither country wants open conflict. But there is deep mistrust and suspicion on both sides. Miscalculations, especially over flashpoints like Taiwan, could trigger a broader and more dangerous escalation.

 

19.             Both powers claim they do not wish to force countries to choose sides. But in reality, each seeks to draw others closer into their respective orbits. This rivalry is already reshaping our world, and will continue to define the geopolitical landscape for years to come.

 

20.            So, we are in the midst of a messy transition globally. To what, nobody can tell. America is stepping back from its traditional role as the guarantor of order and the world’s policeman. But neither China nor any other country is willing – or able to – fill the vacuum. So nations are turning inward, prioritising their own narrow interests. The once-rising tide of global cooperation that defined the past decades is giving way to one of growing competition and distrust.  And as a result, the world is becoming more fragmented and disorderly. 

 

Shifting Sands and Changing Rules

 

21.            Amidst these geopolitical realities, countries everywhere are re-examining their strategic assumptions and recalibrating their policies. 

 

22.            In Europe, many were surprised by America’s ambiguity on security guarantees for Ukraine and NATO, and its uneven treatment of allies and partners.  There is palpable anxiety about over-reliance on US military support, and European countries are fundamentally rethinking their defence postures.

 

23.            France has raised the idea of extending its nuclear umbrella to other European partners for example; Poland has expressed interest in gaining access to nuclear weapons; and Germany’s Bundestag has voted to exempt defence spending from its fiscal rule. These are not minor shifts. They reflect a deeper and more fundamental realisation in Europe: that the post-Cold War peace dividend is over, and Europe must now reinvest in its own defence and resilience. 

 

24.            In Asia, these developments are being watched just as closely. 

 

a.    Former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida once warned that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow”. That warning carries greater weight and urgency today. 

 

b.   The abrupt recalibration in American support for Europe has prompted Asian countries to question the durability of America’s commitment to the region. 

 

c.    In his first trip to Asia, the US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth sought to reassure regional partners. He said that “America First does not mean America alone”, and that the US would “prioritise and shift to [Asia] in a way that is unprecedented… [and] establish the deterrence necessary to prevent war”. 

 

d.   Even so, countries will take steps to strengthen their own capabilities just in case help does not arrive in time. They will remember that President Obama  once declared that  US was rebalancing towards Asia, but this stance was not sustained in subsequent US administrations. So that’s why in both Japan and South Korea, public debate over defence has intensified. There are calls to bolster deterrence, including through enhanced missile and air defences – and even discussions, once considered taboo, about acquiring nuclear weapons. What was once unthinkable is now openly contemplated. 

 

e.    So all this marks a major psychological shift across the region. If these trends persist, it could reshape Asia’s strategic balance in fundamental ways – leading to heightened military build-up, riskier deterrence postures, and a more brittle regional security environment. 

 

25.            Alongside growing geopolitical unease, we are seeing growing turbulence in the international economic system. 

 

a.    There is a well-known adage in international economics about the trilemma between economic interdependence, economic security and geopolitical competition – only two can coexist at the same time, but not all three.

 

b.   After the end of the Cold War, geopolitical tensions subsided. Hence countries could embrace interdependence while maintaining a broad sense of economic security.

 

c.    Today, geopolitical competition has returned with a vengeance. The major powers no longer feel economically secure. Something has got to give. Where economic interdependence was once seen as a virtue, it is now seen as a vulnerability. Therefore, governments are responding by localising production, building up self-sufficiency, and reasserting greater control over critical supply chains and strategic industries. 

 

d.   Economic instruments – like tariffs, export controls and sanctions – are being used not for market purposes, but as instruments of statecraft to advance national interests. 

 

26.            These trends are not new, but they have reached a new intensity with the latest US tariff moves.  

 

a.    The US has since postponed most of its “reciprocal” tariffs.  But there is little comfort in this. The current baseline tariff rates are still much higher than what they used to be. And the changes have already created great uncertainty for businesses everywhere. No company can comfortably plan long-term investments while knowing that the tariff rates could be changed at a moment’s notice.

 

b.   Moreover, the US and China are entering a full-blown trade war. The US tariffs on Chinese goods are now 145%; China has responded with tariffs on US goods at 125% and vowed to “fight to the end”. At these rates, trading between the two countries will grind to a halt. The pain will be felt not just by them but by countries everywhere.

 

c.    For now, neither side wants to back down. There are no obvious off-ramps; no easy paths to de-escalate. 

 

d.   The deterioration of trade ties will accelerate the decoupling of the two economies. What we are witnessing is the remaking of the global economy – not as one integrated system, but as increasingly bifurcated ecosystems centred around the US and China. 

 

e.    As economic ties fray, other aspects of the US-China relationship will come under greater strain. Trust will erode further. Tensions will rise across multiple domains.

 

Singapore’s Approach

 

27.            I have just shared what I think is a sobering but realistic assessment of what is happening globally. For a small open economy like Singapore, these global developments are deeply worrying. 

 

28.            Our prosperity has depended on a stable rules-based global order and the free flow of trade, capital, people and ideas. As the old order frays, a new one will eventually emerge. It is likely to be more multipolar, less coordinated and more contested. It will not be shaped by the grand designs of a single superpower, nor by a harmonious concord of all the major powers, but more by the actions and choices of many different players.

 

29.            Despite our limitations as a small state, we cannot afford to be a passive bystander in this evolving landscape. Instead, we must respond with agility and resolve, and actively shape our own destiny.  Singapore today is not without agency. We are better resourced, more capable, more connected than we were in 1965. We have forged strong friendships around the world. The Singapore brand is well regarded, and we enjoy a deep reservoir of international goodwill. 

 

30.            More importantly, we are not alone. There are many like-minded countries that share our commitment to an open, stable and rules-based global system. So we can and we will deepen and expand our networks with them. Together, we can preserve the multilateral frameworks that matter, and lay the groundwork now for a more stable global order to emerge in the years ahead.

 

31.             It is with that in mind that, we will move forward on three key thrusts.

 

32.            First, we will contribute actively to the stewardship of the global commons.

 

33.            Many of the world’s most pressing challenges – from AI governance and climate change to future pandemics – require more global cooperation, not less.   

 

34.            When we say we support international law and multi­lateralism, we are not just hoping for the best; we are actively working to make things happen. We understand that our interests as a small state are best protected when rules apply equally to all, and we take concrete steps to uphold those rules.

 

35.            Singapore has consistently played a constructive role in multilateral forums – not by grandstanding, but by building consensus and finding solutions. 

 

a.    Most recently, our Ambassador Rena Lee led the successful UN negotiations on the High Seas Treaty on biodiversity – a landmark agreement that strengthens global governance over marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.  It is a remarkable achievement and it shows that despite a fraught geopolitical environment, it is still possible for the world to come together to find consensus.

 

b.   We have nominated Rena as a candidate to serve as a judge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – a reflection of our continued commitment to the rule of law in international affairs.

 

36.            Singapore can also serve as an incubator for practical ideas and initiatives. 

 

a.    For example, during the Covid-19 pandemic, we founded and co-chaired the Friends of Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility to promote “vaccine multilateralism”.

 

b.   More recently, we launched the Financing Asia’s Transition Partnership (FAST-P) – this is a blended finance platform aimed at mobilising private capital to support Asia’s decarbonisation. 

 

37.            Given our developmental journey, we can also do more to support other countries’ development by sharing our experience. 

 

a.    Our approach is centred on supporting human capital development, which we believe is the fundamental ingredient for any country’s success. 

 

b.   We do this through curated training programmes and study visits to build capacity and to catalyse change.

 

38.            We have been able to make an impact. Since 1992, the Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP) has benefited more than 155,000 officials from over 180 countries, territories and intergovernmental organisations. 

 

39.            We will do more in these challenging times. 

 

a.    That is why we have established a new Development Partnership Unit in MFA – to coordinate efforts across government agencies in Singapore, strengthen collaborations, and focus on areas where Singapore can make a meaningful impact. 

 

b.   We will continue to focus on Southeast Asia, which is our region. But we will also set aside more resources for partners further afield, in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, the Pacific, and the Caribbean, and we will expand our work in new domains like the digital economy and renewable energy.

 

40.            Through these efforts, we hope to be a responsible stakeholder that helps shape a more stable, resilient and inclusive global environment. 

 

41.            Second, we will champion deeper regional cohesion and integration.

 

42.            ASEAN remains central to Singapore’s foreign policy. In a fragmented world, regional unity matters more than ever. If ASEAN can stay cohesive and proactive, it will help all ten members navigate geopolitical tensions and maintain our collective relevance. As Mr S Rajaratnam once said at the founding of ASEAN, if we do not hang together, we will end up hanging separately.

 

43.            ASEAN’s economic integration has come a long way. Combined, we are now the world’s 5^th largest economy. We have managed to make the ASEAN Free Trade Area virtually tariff-free,, not yet 100%, so there is still some way to go. These gains have already benefitted our citizens and businesses.

 

44.            But we cannot and we should not stop here. We have to accelerate our integration efforts.

 

a.    We should aim for 100% tariff elimination across the region and boost intra-ASEAN trade. We should further reduce non-tariff barriers to make it easier for businesses to operate across ASEAN. 

 

b.   We should also conclude the ASEAN Digital Economic Framework Agreement (DEFA), and upgrade our FTAs with key partners like China, India and the Republic of Korea.  

 

c.    We should also accelerate the development of the ASEAN Power Grid. By facilitating cross-border electricity trade, the Grid will help our region to transition faster to green energy, draw in new investments, create better jobs, and strengthen our collective energy security. 

 

45.            Beyond our immediate neighbourhood, ASEAN has, over the decades, built an open and inclusive regional architecture. Through forums like the East Asia Summit, we bring all the major powers to the same table, and give them a stake in our region’s success. 

 

46.            Complementing the EAS, we have the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). This emphasises openness, inclusivity and cooperation. It explicitly rejects zero-sum competition or dominance by any single power. 

 

47.            So Singapore will  work with the Malaysian Chair of ASEAN and our EAS partners to translate the AOIP’s vision into concrete projects and initiatives. We hope this will bolster the relevance of ASEAN and the EAS.

 

48.            And when Singapore takes over the ASEAN chair in 2027, which will also mark ASEAN’s 60^th anniversary – we will use the opportunity to deepen regional integration, and ensure that ASEAN remains a vital and credible anchor for peace and prosperity in Asia. 

 

49.            Thirdly, we will strengthen our global network of partnerships.

 

50.            In this increasingly multipolar world, we must develop more varied and deeper relations with multiple partners. Because the more connected we are, the more resilient we will be – and the better we can navigate uncertainty and withstand shocks. 

 

51.            Economically, we are already plugged into major networks and  frameworks – the CPTPP, RCEP, and an extensive network of FTAs. These give us market access, and insulation against rising protectionism. 

 

52.            But we must go further – to reinforce the multilateral trading system, and preserve open flows of trade and investment. Over the past week, I have spoken with counterparts from Malaysia, Japan, New Zealand, the UK and the EU. We represent different countries across different regions. But we all agreed on one thing: the world needs more cooperation, not less. And we must not retreat into protectionism or isolationism. 

 

53.            One idea we are pursuing is greater collaboration between the CPTPP and the EU. The UK is already in the CPTPP, and there are several economies keen to join as members. The CPTPP and the EU combined represent around 30% of the world’s GDP. A formal partnership between the two entities can facilitate trade and investment flows, and help to uphold the key principles of the rules-based trading system. 

 

54.            Another idea is to strengthen the ASEAN-EU Strategic Partnership. The EU has been a Dialogue Partner since 1977. It already has FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, and is pursuing trade arrangements with other ASEAN countries. So deeper collaboration between our regions on concrete projects can help us make progress towards the eventual goal of an ASEAN-EU FTA, and unlock the potential of our combined market of over 1 billion people.

 

55.            Beyond economic partnerships, we are deepening and expanding strategic partnerships with like-minded countries – including Australia, New Zealand, India, France, Germany, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, the UK and Vietnam. 

 

56.            We are reaching out to new frontiers in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

 

a.    In the Middle East, the Gulf countries are growing rapidly, and positioning themselves as key geopolitical players in their own right. We have a Comprehensive Partnership with the UAE, and we just upgraded our relations with Saudi Arabia to a Strategic Partnership. We have also institutionalised dialogues with Qatar and Oman. So we will do more not just with the Gulf countries but also other Middle Eastern partners.

 

b.   And we will step up efforts to develop ties with Africa and Latin America. These regions are brimming with potential, but we have not fully engaged them due to distance or unfamiliarity.

 

c.    We now only have two diplomatic missions serving the entire continent of Africa (in Cairo and Pretoria) and only one in Latin America. This is insufficient. We will open new diplomatic missions in Africa and Latin America over the next few years.

 

d.   We hope that this will show our friends in Africa and Latin America that Singapore is keen to do more – to trade, invest and partner with them for mutual benefit.

 

Thriving in a Turbulent World

 

57.            These are the steps that we will take to navigate this increasingly fragmented and turbulent world.

 

58.            Like in 1965, we once again find ourselves in uncharted waters.  We are still a small country with no natural resources. But we are no longer the Singapore of six decades ago. 

 

59.            We have built deeper capabilities, and become stronger and more resilient. 

 

a.    We have found innovative ways to overcome our lack of critical resources – be it water, land or energy.

 

b.   We have carefully built up our financial reserves, providing us with a vital cushion in times of crises. 

 

c.    And we have built up a strong and effective SAF and Home Team. Because from the outset, we recognised the importance of defence and homeland security. And unlike some places which scaled back conscription or cut back on defence spending, we consistently invested in these areas over the years and strengthened our institution of National Service.

 

d.   Singaporeans know that if we are ever threatened, no one will come to our rescue. No one else will safeguard Singapore’s interest or secure our future for us. We can only depend on ourselves. 

 

60.            No doubt Singaporeans today are also more well-travelled and more well-informed about the world.

 

a.    Many do not just want to know how Singapore will be affected by developments elsewhere; they also want to know how we are responding, and why.

 

b.   Naturally be differences in views, and even strongly-held opinions of how we should position ourselves internationally on global issues. In fact, it is a sign of a healthy and mature citizenship to have a diversity in views and opinions.

 

c.    But we must never let our diversity become a source of division. And in an increasingly fractious and polarised world, we must hold fast to what binds us together – a sense of mutual respect, shared purpose, and the conviction that what unites us is far stronger than anything that can divide us. 

 

61.            Ultimately, Singapore’s survival and success in this uncertain world will not rest only on the actions of its leaders or the efforts of our diplomats abroad, capable as they are, and we do have very capable diplomats. In the end, it depends on all of us as Singaporeans – our belief in our nation, and our shared sense of responsibility to protect our home and our fellow citizens.

 

62.            Singapore may be an island. But we cannot have an island mentality. We have to look out for one another. We have to strengthen our bonds of fellowship – within our society, and with others beyond our shores. This applies not just to us individually but as a nation too. Even if other countries turn inward, we have to remain open – open to ideas, open to partnerships and open to opportunity. We have no choice. Because that has always been Singapore’s way – not to retreat but to reach out; not to build barriers, but to build bridges. 

 

63.            For centuries, Singapore has served as a safe harbour and a natural meeting point for cultures, commerce and exchange – be it as the maritime town of Temasek, or as a free-trading entrepot in the British empire, or as today’s sovereign global city-state. 

 

64.            Before the advent of the steam engine, ships traversing the region were at the mercy of the monsoon winds, which brought rough seas, unpredictable weather, and unfavourable winds.

 

a.    Ships would often have to find safe harbour and wait for the winds to clear or to turn favourable, before carrying on their journey.

 

b.   The monsoon patterns of maritime travel meant sailors, traders and immigrants from China, India, the Malay Archipelago and the Middle East would then come to Singapore as a meeting point, as a hub, to meet, trade and settle.

 

65.            The monsoon winds are blowing again. But we do not need to cower, and we certainly will not capitulate. We cannot control the global currents. But we can chart our own course with courage, foresight and skill. 

 

66.            So, Singapore will continue to be a safe harbour, a global emporium, and a trusted hub for all sides to engage. In so doing, we will ensure that our people can earn a good living, and generate products, ideas and contributions that bring value to ourselves and also to the world. 

 

67.            So let us not fear, let us stay united and weather the storms ahead as one people. Let us continue to turn our vulnerabilities into strength. And let us stay true to the spirit that built this nation, and ensure that this Little Red Dot continues to shine brightly as a beacon of hope stability and purpose on the world stage.